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TELEGRAM

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SECRET

HCG834

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ACTION EUR 20

INFO SS 25, NSC 10, CIAE 00, GPM 04, INR 07, L 03, NEA 13, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02,

USIA 12, H 02, RSR 01, ACDA 16, SAH 02, SAL 01, SA 01, NSA 02, /126 W

R 261910Z AUG 68
 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5699
 INFO US NATO 415
 AMEMBASSY BONN
 USNMR SHAPE
 USCINCEUR
 DOD WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 12119

DOD FOR ISA/OSD

SUBJ: POLITICAL WARNING

REF: US NATO 4330 AND 4364

1. EMBOFF HAD OPPORTUNITY TODAY TO RAISE HOFMANN AND
 ONCKEN VIEWS RE POLITICAL WARNING IN SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS
 WITH BARNES (HEAD, WESTERN ORGAN DEPT., FONOFF) AND
 WITH NASH (ASST. UNDER SEC) AND MACDONALD (ASST SEC),
 POLICY, MOD.

2. BARNES TOOK LINE REMARKABLY SIMILAR TO VERY CONSTRUCTIVE
 POINTS CONTAINED IN US NATO 4364. IN BARNES' JUDGMENT
 FRG DOUBTS AS TO EFFICACY OF POLITICAL WARNING FOUNDED
 ON LONG HELD GERMAN RESERVATIONS REGARDING NATO STRATEGY.
 BARNES STATED THAT FRG HAS NEVER BEEN SOLD ON LINK
 BETWEEN CONCEPT OF POLITICAL WARNING AND REDEPLOYED US-UK
 FORCES AND RECKONS GERMANS MAY HAVE SEIZED ON CZECH CRISIS
 TO FORESTALL ANY FURTHER CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS,
 PARTICULARLY FROM U.S. SIDE. BARNES ASSERTED THAT AS
 FAR AS HMG CONCERNED THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING ASSOCIATED
 WITH CZECH CRISIS TO INVALIDATE UK VIEWS ON POLITICAL WARNING.
 HOWEVER, HE AGREES THAT FRG CONCERN CANNOT BE FORBIDDEN

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AND FONOFF AND MOD STAFF HAS ALREADY BEEN DIRECTED TO PULL TOGETHER APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE FOR BURROWS IN ANTICIPATION OF NAC DISCUSSIONS IN DETAIL ON POLITICAL WARNING AND OTHER QUESTIONS IN COURSE OF NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS. BARNES ADDED THAT AS US AND UK OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE TO KEEP IN CLOSE PHASE ON THIS MATTER IN BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON AND LONDON HE WOULD KEEP US POSTED AS TO BRITISH THINKING AND NAC TACTICAL APPROACH.

3. NASH AND MACDONALD TOOK PARALLEL LINE TO BARNES. MOD VIEW (AS REPRESENTED BY NASH AND MACDONALD) IS THAT FRG HAS CAPITALIZED ON CZECH CRISIS TO QUESTION THEOLOGY OF POLITICAL WARNING AS MEANS TO FORESTALL FURTHER US FORCE CUTS IN NATO. THEY VIEW KIESINGER'S COMMENTS ABOUT NATO EROSION AND SUMMITRY IN THIS LIGHT.

4. IN FOREGOING CONTEXT ALL THREE BRITS EXPRESSED RELIEF THAT MANSFIELD INITIATIVE FOR FORCE REDUCTIONS APPEARED EFFECTIVELY INTERRED, AT LEAST FOR UPCOMING SESSION OF CONGRESS. HOWEVER UK SIDE CURIOUS AS TO WHAT AFFECT THIS WOULD HAVE ON ADMINISTRATION REVIEW OF FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE FROM DEPARTMENT ON THIS POINT. BRUCE

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ACTION EUR 20
INFO NEA 13,CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,USIE 00,USUE 00,CIAE 00,GPM 04,H 02,
INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 25,SAH 02,SA 01,
SAL 01,ACDA 16,IO 13,RSR 01,/125 W

P R 262146Z AUG 68
FM USMISSION NATO
D SECSTATE PRIORITY 3040
SECDEF
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
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AMEMBASSY ROME
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AMEMBASSY LISBON
MEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK UNN

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 USNATO 4381/2

GD PASS CHAIRMAN JCS

SUBJ: BROSI0 VIEWS ON POST-CZECH REASSESSMENTS

7. ONE SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT SEEMS IN ORDER NOW: IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH THE QUESTION OF POSTURE AND ACTIONS IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO THE CZECH SITUATION ON WHICH, DESPITE OCCASIONAL SNIPING, THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSIBLE SUGGESTION THAT NATO SHOULD HAVE TAKEN OTHER THAN A "LOW PROFILE" POSTURE, FROM A KIND OF "MALAISE" WHICH MAY ADVERSELY AFFECT SOME ELEMENTS OF NATO'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT. SOME EUROPEANS ARE "DISCOVERING" THAT DESPITE ALL THE TALK

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-- ESPECIALLY FROM THE U.S. -- IN RECENT YEARS ABOUT CRISIS MANAGEMENT, FLEXIBILITY, MOBILITY, MOBILIZATION, POLITICAL WARING, ETC., THE MORE LIKELY KIND OF CRISIS IS ONE LIKE THE PRESENT, I.E., INTERNAL TO EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH MAKES IT POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR NATO TO IMPLEMENT THOSE CONCEPTS FOR FEAR OF BEING PROVOCATIVE. THUS, THE CONCEPTS THEMSELVES HAVE TENDED TO COME UNDER ATTACK; AND WHILE WE THINK THERE ARE SOME GOOD REBUTTALS, E.G., ON WARNING TIME (SEE USNATO 4364), THE CRITICS MAY HAVE ONE VALID POINT. PERHAPS THE MOST LIKELY CONTINGENCY DIRECTLY THREATENING NATO WOULD BE A FOLLOW-ON TO TENSION WITHIN THE BOLC, I.E., WHERE THE PACT SUBSEQUENTLY DECIDED TO WHIP UP A CRISIS WITH NATO TO OBSCURE OR BRIDGE OVER AN INTERNAL CRISIS. HERE NATO MIGHT NOT BE POLITICALLY IN A POSITION TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF WARNING TIME AND MOBILITY, GIVING THE WARSAW PACT -- AS THINGS STAND JUST NOW -- A SIGNIFICANT HEAD START IN OPERATIONAL READINESS. THIS ASPECT CAN DOUBTLESS BE EXPLORED IN THE DEFENSE REVIEW, WITH A POSSIBILITY THAT FUTURE EXERCISE (SUCH AS ONE INVOLVING THE U.S. REDEPLOYED FORCES, AND SOME SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION OR RESERVE ACTIVATION) COULD BE ARRANGED AGAINST A SCENARIO OF THE NEED FOR "NON-PROVOCATIVE" READINESS MEASURES IN AN ASSUMED HIGH STATE OF TENSION WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT. BUT TO AVOID THE MALAISE GETTING TOO MUCH HEADWAY, ESPECIALLY IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS, IT WOULD SEEM WORTHWHILE TO US TO TRY TO WORK OUT SOME SUCH INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY, EVEN OF A LIMITED NATURE, IN THE NEAR TERM.

GP-4. CLEVELAND

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